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The geopolitical strategy of Belarus underwent 
considerable transformation in the recent decade. 
However, the only thing that has really changed is 
the attitude of the ruling elite to the geopolitical 
situation in Belarus.
One of the most viable concepts of the geopolitical 
development of Belarus, recurrent in the speeches 
of the Belarusian leader as well as in the ideological 
texts, is a strategy of Belarus becoming a “bridge” 
between the East and the West. It is a well known 
fact that such attitude to the geopolitical situa-
tion of Belarus started to develop in the wake of 
Vladimir Putin’s ascent to Kremlin and the shat-
tering of A. Lukashenka’s hopes to be the first to 
get there. Before, the only existing strategy was 
directed towards the integration with Russia. A. 
Lukashenka’s ambitious plans, however, practically 
jeopardized the sovereignty of the country, which 
became evident even to A. Lukashenka himself. 
Subsequent process of the integration with Russia 
had to develop in accordance with the interests of 
Moscow, not Minsk. The direct proof of that were 
energy wars.
Belarusian regime faced the necessity to look for an 
alternative road of the geopolitical development. 
The idea of the “bridge” between the East and the 
West seemed to be, to a certain extent, an ideal 
instrument to provide security to A. Lukashenka’s 
regime and an equal distancing from both geopo-
litical poles, which to a greater or lesser degree 
threatened to undermine the stability of the regime. 
Europe threatened with its democratization and 
Russia with its imperial plans. Statements made 
by the authorities, steps taken in the direction of 
improving relations with the EU (economic forum 
in London) could speak in favor of the formation 
of two-sided geo-policy of Belarus.
In practice, however, balanced and well-measured 
two-direction geo-policy does not exist. Geo-policy 
of the Belarusian regime today is a sort of “geopo-
litical illusion”, which deludes the regime itself and, 
perhaps, the EU, too.
Two-sided geo-policy of such country as Belarus 
has to mean that it maintains political and economic 
relations with the EU as well as with Russia. There 
is no such equilibrium and it has never existed. If 
Belarus wants to talk of some kind of two-sided 
geo-policy, it has at least to secede from the Union 
State with Russia.
In the opinion of numerous independent Belaru-
sian analysts, the given Union is a sheer formality. 
Nevertheless, such kind of project, even a formal 
one, wherein a vista for the integration might be 
Eastern Europe Studies Centre (EESC) brings to 
your attention the first issue of the “Bell” – an 
electronic Belarus info letter prepared by the ex-
perts of the EESC as well as partner think-tanks 
in Belarus. The “Bell” is a new monthly newsletter 
designed to present an overview of Belarus political, 
economic and social life as seen through the eyes 
of Belarusians themselves.
The idea of the “Bell” came up in the 2008 in the 
framework of the project Enhancing Research 
Centers’ Activities in Belarus, implemented by 
the EESC and funded by the Nordic Council of 
Ministers. Discussions with researchers from 
Belarus as well as with experts on the Belarus 
issue have evidenced that among the analyses of 
Belarus political, economic and social life there are 
only few which present the picture as seen from 
the inside, i.e. take the perspective of Belarusians 
themselves. To fill this intellectual gap the idea to 
publish a monthly analytical newsletter has been 
put forward. 
Attended by representatives of leading Belarus 
think-tanks, the first meeting of the project resulted 
in an agreement on a wide range of joint activities 
aimed at increasing the visibility of Belarusian 
think-tanks inside Belarus as well as in the European 
Union. Electronic publication of the “Bell” is just 
one of the activities that the experts of Belarusian 
think tanks decided to undertake in the framework 
of this project. 
The first issue of the “Bell” focuses on the new 
European Initiative – Eastern Partnership. Widely 
discussed in the EU, this initiative is usually pre-
sented as a new “great leap forward” in the relations 
between the European Union and Belarus.
Laurynas Jonavicius, Editor 
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provided, doesn’t exist in the relationship between 
Belarus and the EU.
The direct confirmation of the fact, that geopoliti-
cal priorities of the Republic of Belarus continue 
to be of a single direction - towards Russia, are 
A. Lukashenka’s recent statements voiced for the 
French newspaper France Press: “We do not even 
set ourselves the task of joining the EU”, declared 
A. Lukashenka, ”We never even tried to discuss 
such an issue.  It may happen that some day those 
issues may come to the fore. But so far they don’t”1. 
This could be an indirect proof of the fact that 
Belarusian regime does not intend to balance out 
its geopolitical direction.
More than that: all the time, irrespective of the 
political conflicts between Moscow and Minsk 
concerning the rising energy prices, relations with 
Russia always outweighed relations with Europe. 
At the same time, after the energy wars of 2004 
and 2006 A. Lukashenka’s regime failed to do 
something that might have decreased the geopoliti-
cal dependence on Russia although it had an apt 
moment to do that.
It should also be stressed that the freezing of inte-
gration processes with Russia failed to take place 
although after the year 2000 it became increasingly 
clear that the union state would be used by Russia 
for the implementation of its imperial plans and 
re-establishment of control over the former USSR 
territories. Besides, Belarus failed to secede from 
other military-political and economic projects 
wherein Russia is a party. The fact that in the peri-
ods of tension in Belarusian-Russian relations A. 
Lukashenka radically changed his rhetoric doesn’t 
lead to radical changes in the policy of Belarus. Of-
ficial media, A. Lukashenka himself and ideological 
machinery of his administration accused Moscow 
of the economic aggression and imperialism2, 
nevertheless, the political regime didn’t take any 
steps to decrease the threat to the sovereignty of 
the country or to distance itself from Russia.
It seems that the problem is the dependence of 
Belarusian regime on Russia which doesn’t allow the 
regime to move away. Besides, the fact that today’s 
Russia is not Russia that it used to be 10 years ago 
has to be taken into consideration. Strong and ag-
gressive Moscow is capable of taking any measures 
to defend its geopolitical interests. Apart from that, 
today Moscow is the only guarantor of stability of 
the undemocratic political regime in Belarus. A. 
Lukashenka found himself in the psychological 
vassalage of Kremlin since his neo-authoritarian 
regime would not withstand the onset of democ-
ratization from the West unless there is Russia’s 
hand behind Lukashenka’s back.
1  Belarus does not seek membership of the EU or 
NATO, declared Alexander Lukashenka http://
belapan.com/archive/2008/11/27/269065/.
2  President of Belarus denominated policy of Moscow 
as being imperial and proposed to write off each oth-
er’s debts http://www.ntvru.com/world/06feb2007/
batko_rassudil.html#2 on 6th of  February 2007.
In other words, alliance with Russia provides Be-
larusian regime with political as well as economic 
guarantees of stability and security in exchange for 
its geopolitical fidelity to RF.
As it has already been mentioned, Russia’s political 
guarantees to Belarus include a stable support of 
the political regime in the international arena and 
restraint of democratization wave. All elections that 
were organized in Belarus and were deemed to be 
illegitimate by the West, including the recent elec-
tion to the House of Representatives, are without 
exception recognized by Russia. It goes without 
saying that Russia preserves political processes 
in Belarus and at the same time complicates the 
possibility of a dialogue between Belarus and the 
West since the basis for such dialogue is political 
transformation of the regime.
One more factor that drives Belarus in the direc-
tion of Russia is economics.  Russia is an enormous 
market for the products of Belarusian enterprises 
as well as a space which absorbs Belarusian unem-
ployment. In 2006 alone the active trade balance 
of Belarus with Russia accounted for 20 billion 
USD, in 2007 –23 billion USD and it is expected 
that in 2008 it will reach 40 billion USD.3  At the 
same time commodity circulation between Belarus 
and the EU in 2007, according to the data of the 
MFA of Belarus made up only 14 billion USD.4 
Although the Belarusian authorities state that the 
EU takes the 1st place among the importers of its 
domestic products. 
The share of Belarusian export within the general 
scope of Russian-Belarusian trade decreased in the 
given period from 42.5% to 34% while the share of 
the EU countries in the Belarusian export, on the 
contrary, increased. Thus, in 2000 it amounted to 
28.5% and in 2007 – to 43.6%. According to the 
results of the first half of the year 2008 the share 
of Russia made up already 32% of the Belarusian 
export, while the share of the EU countries – 45.1%.5 
3  Commodity circulation of Belarus and Russia in 
2008 may amount to USD 40 billion - V.Popov http://
www.export.by/?act=news&mode=view&id=4021.
4 On the Cooperation of the Republic of Bela-
rus and the EU in the political sphere, <http://
www.mfa.gov.by/ru/foreign-policy/internation-
al-organizations/mo/fd2be694ad14f50f.html> .
5  A. Kozlovich. “Present sixth position of Belarus in 
the trade with Russia is far from being the best in  the 
post-soviet period” “Narodnja Gazeta”, -No.218.
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However, this is due to the supply of raw materials, 
oil products, potassium fertilizers to the Euro-
pean market and not of the manufactured goods. 
Russian market, on the contrary, is supplied with 
the products of light and basic industry as well as 
foodstuffs: meat, milk, cheese, sugar. For example, 
when Russia informed about its plans to cut the 
import of Belarusian sugar in early 2007 all sugar 
industry of the country found itself on the verge 
of a total catastrophe. Analysts started talking 
of a new round of Russian-Belarusian economic 
confrontation which was given the name of “sugar 
war”. In 2008, however, the parties signed an ad-
ditional agreement whereby supply of Belarusian 
sugar to Russia grew from 100 thousand of tons to 
150 thousand of tons.6
The situation of Belarusian unemployment looks 
pretty much the same. According to various data, 
from 50 thousand to 100 thousand Belarusians are 
employed in Russia, only 7 thousand of which are 
employed legally7 (according to the official statistics, 
unemployment level in Belarus is 1%).
All these factors are being used as tools of pressure 
on A. Lukashenka’s regime. It is quite easy to imagine 
what would ensue, if unemployment level in Belarus 
shot up and what impact this might produce on the 
political situation in the country.
On the top of all this, Russia is the biggest credi-
tor of Belarus. In 2007 Russia provided to Belarus 
1.5 billion USD stabilization loan. In 2008 Russia 
provided 1 billion USD loan and is about to add 1 
billion in 2009. 
The following fact could also support the statement 
that “two directions” in Belarusian geo-policy are 
non-existent.  Belarus is a party of four major geo-
political, economic and military-strategic projects 
dominated by Russia. Those projects are the Union 
State of Belarus and Russia, Commonwealth of 
Independent States, Collective Security Treaty Or-
ganization and Euro-Asian Economic Union. And 
although some projects are formal and symbolical, 
6   Oficjalna strona Państwa Sojusznego, <  http://www.
soyuzinfo.ru/ru/in_focus/news/index.php?id4=123124.
7  Belarusians who are officially employed abroad sel-
dom complain about the conditions of their em-
ployment, <http://naviny.by/rubrics/socie-
ty/2008/05/07/ic_news_116_290226/.
as for example, CIS, they form a geopolitical space 
which is dominated by Russia. On the other hand, 
Belarus is not a party of any geopolitical project, 
even a symbolic or formal one, wherein the EU 
is a party. More than that: it has to be taken into 
account that Belarus and Russia maintain active 
cooperation in the military sphere and together 
withstand the virtual enemy – the West. The EU 
is also in the ranks of the enemy since the majority 
of European states are members of NATO.
Military cooperation is based on the creation of 
a single defense system, including anti-missile 
defense. The parties organize and carry out joint 
strategic exercises and Belarusian army is equipped 
with the armament produced in Russia. Accord-
ing to the statement of Belarusian authorities, in 
the near future Belarus plans to purchase Russian 
armaments for 1 billion USD, including “Iskander” 
missile system8.
Thus due to objective reasons the direction towards 
Russia is of greater priority to Belarus than the 
one towards Europe. The only fact that testifies A. 
Lukashenka’s attempts to preserve “geopolitical 
autonomy” is his unwillingness to recognize in-
dependence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This 
aspect, however, does not bring Belarus and the 
EU together in terms of geopolitics.
One of the indices of the Belarusian geopolitical 
attachment to Russia and the impossibility of Be-
larusian “two-direction” policy is the integration 
process within the Union State.  Nobody has the 
slightest doubt that integration with Russia is a 
direct threat to the sovereignty of Belarus and the 
political regime but the possibility to avoid further 
integration, however, is subject to great doubts. 
Recent events show that A. Lukashenka is unwilling 
to continue the process of integration with Russia 
but at the same time he fails to have strength and 
willpower to stop the given process. The only thing 
he may do is to extend it to the indefinite deadline 
and at the same time preserve the possibility to 
maintain relations with Russia that are useful for 
his political regime. 
The key issue in the problem of integration, however, 
is not A. Lukashenka’s will or his aspirations but 
Russia’s interests. In recent years Russia is quite 
seriously disposed towards the restoration of the 
former empire and the union with Belarus could 
be one of the tools in the process of bringing those 
plans into reality.
From a formal and legal standpoint Union treaty 
is the best possibility to incorporate Belarus since 
this may be done on the basis and of free will of two 
nations and in accordance with the international 
law. In this case neither the USA nor Europe can 
accuse Russia of the absence of legal rights and 
imperialism.
Russia’s actions which demonstrate that it wants 
to use the Union with Belarus to its own interests 
are obvious:
8  Беларусь можа ўзброіцца на мільярд далраў, < 
http://www.svaboda.org/content/Article/1332609.html.
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1) Russia became more active in conducting its 
information campaign on the positive proc-
esses in the sphere of integration and the 
necessity to complete it without further delay. 
It has also become increasingly clear that top 
Russia’s officials - Premier V. Putin as well as 
president D. Medvedev - started to take up the 
issue of integration during their meetings with 
Lukashenka more often than before. This also 
happened during V. Putin’s visit to Minsk on 25 
October 2008.
2) A serious sign of the fact that Russia is interested 
in the further integration was the appointment 
of V. Putin to the post of the Chairman of the 
Council of Ministers of the Union State. It may 
be argued that V. Putin would not have accepted 
the given post if it had been only a formal post 
without any possibilities to execute any realistic 
authority in the future.
3) Russia has already started using the Union as a 
tool for the implementation of its geopolitical 
interests. Thus on 12 September the Parliament 
of the Union supported the will of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia to accede to the Union State. 
South Ossetia was even granted the status of a 
permanent observer at the Parliament of the 
Union. In the future (and it is Russia’s greatest 
wish) those unrecognized republics may accede 
the Union state automatically after Belarus has 
recognized their independence. This, in turn, 
means that the Union started developing real 
political and geopolitical forms wherein Belarus 
will be ascribed only the status of a secondary 
element. Recognition of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia will become a very important event with 
respect to Belarus-Russia-EU (West) since the 
recognition will rob Belarus of the possibility 
for political maneuver and will finally attach 
Belarus to Russia.
4) Moscow expects from Belarus concrete steps in 
implementing the integration project and insists 
on the introduction of a single currency and the 
adoption of the Union Constitution. 
Under these conditions it is difficult to talk of Be-
larus as the country pursuing its own geo-policy 
and possessing a certain geopolitical doctrine. The 
statements made by A. Lukashenka and Belarusian 
authorities are inconsistent with the general geopo-
litical situation of Belarus which, seemingly, stopped 
being a geopolitical subject and became an object 
of geopolitical interests of Russia. A. Lukashenka’s 
wish and his pronouncements that Belarus pursues 
a well-balanced geo-policy with the West and with 
Russia is an illusion, which may cost the country 
its independence.
Moreover, geopolitical processes, wherein Belarus 
takes part, show that today Belarus is very far away 
from the real geopolitical equilibrium between Rus-
sia and the EU. Besides, hopes that A. Lukashenka 
will manage to establish that equilibrium are quite 
negligible. 
Sierz Naurodski, CASE Belarus
2008 financial crisis, shipped from USA to Europe, 
is coming to Belarus. Belarusian decision-makers 
choose these days between devaluation and stability 
of country’s currency, Belarusian rubble. In other 
words, Belarusian authorities choose between col-
lapse of the previous “economic miracle” policy and 
loosing total control over the business. There is also 
the third option of a deep financial reform which 
may come true after 10 years of expectation.  
In November it became obvious that Belarusian 
economy will face the wrecks of 2008 financial 
crisis. According to Ministry of Statistics, capital 
investments in Belarus fell by 21.2 %in October 
2008 comparing to September 2008, retail turno-
ver has decreased by 3.8 %, industrial output was 
2.9 % less. It is also obvious that Belarus will have 
to work on the individual rescue plan dissimilar 
to any other European country. The situation is 
unique due to rapidly growing trade deficit ($4.7 
billion in October 2008, growth by 46.9% compar-
ing to October 2007). Thus there is a challenge for 
Belarusian decision makers to solve two major 
problems: to neutralize effects of global financial 
turmoil and to balance the balance of payment. 
The exchange rate of Belarusian rubble (BYR) will 
be the main point of discussion for Belarusian 
authorities in 2008-2009. There are two possible 
alternative decisions: 
1)   Keep the currency within 10% yearly devaluation 
margin (no more than 2300 BYR for a dollar in 
December 31, 2008; and 2500 BYR for a dollar 
in December 31, 2009). This will help to avoid a 
massive panic withdrawal from country’s bank-
ing sector as well as a rapid growth of “black” 
currency operations (when people start selling 
and buying dollars at the exchange rate much 
higher than set by banks). 
2)  Devaluate rapidly Belarusian rubble up to 80-
100% to the exchange rate of 4000- 5000BYR 
for a dollar. In the short run this step might help 
to improve trade balance and make Belarusian 
export goods relatively cheap in the foreign 
markets, especially in Russian. Recently IMF 
mission proposed to devaluate the rubble by 
20% at least. 
       For the first scenario to come true and effective, 
deep economic reforms are needed. Wide liber-
alization, privatization and tax reform in Belarus 
are the only way to bring foreign investments 
to the country. In this case Belarus will make A. 
Lukashenka’s words about getting into 25 most 
f I n a n c I a l  c r I s I s  I s 
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attractive world economies come true. At the 
same time reforms will terminate the control of 
Belarusian authorities over private business and 
financial flows forever. 
In the case of the second scenario, Belarusians 
apparently will face lower earnings (in dollar 
equivalent) and inflation. “Belarusian economic 
miracle” will be replaced by national distrust in 
both business and politics, which has already hap-
pened in 1996. 
The choice to be made is a political decision at the 
top level. Both of the scenarios have advantages 
and disadvantages. Economists are keen to find 
the consensus.  
But there is the third possible option to undertake 
(finalize, de-facto) a financial reform by introduc-
ing a new Belarusian currency. This new money 
could become the “real” exchange currency unlike 
today’s “Belarusian National Bank payment bills” (it 
is written on the banknotes, if you have an accurate 
look at the Belarusian money). While introducing 
the new currency the exchange rate to US dollar 
and euro can be set at the level corresponding to 
the needed percentage of devaluation, with less 
zeroes on the banknotes, along with new era of 
Belarusian independence. 
When one looks carefully on all three possible 
scenarios for Belarus, market reforms are inevitable 
in each one of them. Reforms are sooner or later 
should be accepted and performed by Belarusian 
government. And I strongly believe that it is the 
best time to start today.
e u - B e l a r u s :  s a M e  d e c I s I o n 
M a k e r s  a n d  d e c I s I o n 
T a k e r s  I n  a  n e w  s e T T I n G
Vyachaslau Pazdnyak, International Portal 
“Wider Europe” www.w-europe.org
Force majeur?
External and domestic energy and financial-
economic factors make the Belarusian authorities 
search for ways to normalize relations with the 
EU. In the opinion of President A. Lukashenka the 
main asset of the EU is technology, while that of 
Belarus is its transit position as a “bridge” between 
the European Union and Russia. By taking this ad-
vantage Belarus would like to play a corresponding 
role in the supply of energy resources from Russia 
to Europe, in the transportation of commodities 
from the European Union to Russia and the other 
way around9. 32% of Belarus’ trade turnover fall on 
EU member states and 44% of Belarusian exports 
go to the EU member states.
Ambassador  Hans-Georg Wieck, former Head 
of the OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in 
Belarus, is of the opinion that Belarusian authorities 
are concerned with the competitiveness of goods 
manufactured in this country look for access to the 
European markets and have to make steps towards 
the liberalization of  Belarusian economy. Economic 
modernization, in its turn, will entail a democratic 
transformation10.
9  25 November 2008, www.belta.by.
10  27 November 2008, www.svaboda.org.
The Belarusian president draws his own conclusions 
from the changing situation. He concurred that the 
EU was worried that Belarus might lose independ-
ence and, besides, the EU has realized the country’s 
important role11. The leaders of the European Union 
made a decision to resume contacts with Belarus 
on the level of Ministers and partially lift the sanc-
tions. The two parties reached an agreement on 
the expansion of contacts between the Belarusian 
government and the European Commission in the 
fields of mutual interest.
According to the Vice Premier of the Government 
of Belarus Andrej Kobiakov, the decision to lift 
the “contrived restrictions and barriers in mutual 
relations” and other following steps of both sides 
“open a new page in the relations”. Understanding 
the necessity to work on the so-called “homework”, 
outlined in the dialogue with the EU, Belarus ex-
pects adequate reciprocal steps from the European 
Union12.
Following the meeting of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Belarus Sergei Martinov with EU High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy Javier Solana and EU troika on October 
13, 2008 in Luxembourg, a visit of the delegation 
of the European Commission to Minsk headed 
by Deputy Director-General of the Directorate-
11  28 November 2008, http://naviny.by.
12  05 November 2008, www.interfax.by  
bymedia.net
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General for External Relations (DG RELEX) Hugues 
Mingarelli took place in early November 2008. The 
delegation brought concrete proposals on how 
bilateral relations should develop, what the EU 
proposes to Belarus and what the EU is expecting 
from it. In particular, the EU initiated coopera-
tion in three new fields: regulation of the quality 
of goods and standards, interaction of financial 
institutions and also in the sphere of agriculture 
and food safety13.
Ways of improving the investment climate in Belarus 
so that its dependence on Russian energy resources 
could be reduced were discussed at the Belarusian 
economic forum in London in November 2008.  
Another major development in the fall of 2008 
was the elaboration of the European Union’s new 
“Eastern Partnership” (EP) programme originally 
proposed by Poland and Sweden. The new Polish-
Swedish initiative raised a considerable interest in 
official Minsk. According to the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Belarus Sergei Martinov, 
Belarus is positive about the policy of the Eastern 
Partnership and proposals from Belarus are taken 
into account by the European Commission14. 
Belarus “confirmed” its readiness to work together 
with the EC on shaping the “Eastern Partnership” 
and even suggested some ideas on its practical 
contents15. The proposals of the EU are of practical 
interest to Belarus and it is in favor of coming closer 
to the European space, including the adoption of 
its economic and ecological standards16.
What is this so far unseen enthusiasm associated 
with? It looks that something the official Minsk 
has been striving for - “de-politization” of the 
European Neighborhood Policy - is to a certain 
extent taking place.
An uncertain dialogue between the official Minsk 
and the European Union has culminated in No-
vember 2008 in a major trade-off in response to 
the promised reduction of the known 12 EU pre-
conditions and pledges addressed to the Belarusian 
government and its people. Jean-Eric Holzapfel, 
Charge d’affaires ad interim of the EC Delega-
tion to Belarus admitted that now the issue is the 
fulfillment of five basic preconditions, i.e. absence 
of political prisoners in the country, adoption of a 
number of measures on the mass media, reform 
of election legislation, improvement of norms for 
NGOs activities, freedom of assembly and freedom 
of expression17.  
Besides, unlike in previous years, this time the EU 
did not bring forward any concrete “road map” or 
“step-by-step strategy” in order to possess a “more 
flexible tool for dialogue and to facilitate subsequent 
positive changes”18. Minsk defines its “homework” 
13  05 November 2008, www.interfax.by. 
14  27 November 2008, www.svaboda.org.
15  Comments of the press secretary of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Andrei Pop-
ov, 03.12.2008, www.mfa.gov.by. 
16  06 November 2008, www.belapan.info.
17  04 December 2008,  www.ej.by.
18  03 December 2008, www.svaboda.org.
by itself. “Contacts with European partners are not 
maintained for the purpose of formalizing the “road-
maps”, - stated Belarus Foreign Ministry spokesman. 
Head of the European Department of the MFA of 
Belarus Denis Sidorenko emphasized the need to 
create a legal basis for the bilateral relations with 
the EU but noted that Brussels should speak “not 
about the preconditions for the development of 
relations with Belarus but rather about its expecta-
tions”. He went on to say that “the cornerstone for 
the development of relations should be the interests 
of ordinary people of the EU and Belarus”19.
In a two-page document sent to Brussels Minsk 
praised the six-moth suspension of visa sanctions 
against Belarusian officials (Council decision of 
October 13, 2008) and expressed readiness to 
normalize political relations and develop coopera-
tion on issues of mutual interest20. In turn, the 
Belarusian authorities pledged to do three things: 
to discuss the ways of improving the country’s 
election code with the OSCE, to permit publica-
tion and legal circulation in Belarus of two (out of 
about 20) opposition newspapers and to organize a 
“round-table” discussion on the internet regulation 
between the Ministry of information and the OSCE 
with the results to be “taken into account” for the 
“further improvement of the relevant legislation 
and its implementation”. 
On November 20, 2008 President Lukashenka 
signed two edicts, which envisage the signing of 
a framework agreement between the Belarusian 
government and the European Commission, 
define the status and conditions for the provision 
of technical assistance under the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) and facilitate 
the functioning of the future EU representative 
office in Belarus. President’s Press Service listed as 
priority the following spheres of cooperation: en-
ergy, transport, customs infrastructure, combating 
illegal migration and international crime, as well as 
protection of the environment21. 
European Union’s Commissioner for External Re-
lations and the European Neighbourhood Policy 
Benita Ferrero-Waldner welcomed the Belarusian 
government’s “important and encouraging steps.” 
“For its part, the Commission is intensifying techni-
cal dialogue with Belarus in the fields of mutual in-
19  15 November 2008, http://naviny.by.
20  21 November 2008, www.belapan.info.
21  21 November 2008, www.belapan.info.
The issues of the 
improvement of the 
investment climate 
in Belarus so that 
its dependence on 
the Russian energy 
resources could 
be decreased were 
discussed at the 
Belarusian economic 
forum in London this 
November.  
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terest and I anticipate concrete results to help foster 
Belarus economic development”, she said22.
Belarusian options of a “big leap” and “catch-up 
development”
It is evident that EP will not and is not meant to 
solve problems that have accumulated in nearly 
two decades in the relations between Minsk and 
Brussels. This is by far not a trick of making “big 
leap” so as to leave them in the past. On the con-
trary, benefits from the would-be participation in 
the EP may come by only as a result of a consistent 
and tedious ascent along all steps of cooperation 
which Belarus has failed to pass but which have 
been successfully coped with by the neighboring 
Ukraine, Moldova and other states.
As it is known, Belarus “dropped out” from the 
ENP-plus process, which encompasses the adop-
tion of a country strategy, joint elaboration of a 
neighborhood action plan, setting up monitoring 
and implementation structures, etc.
A limited participation in three neighborhood 
programmes, the Belarusian authorities’ failure to 
launch numerous projects involving EU and Belarus, 
even those aimed at overcoming the consequences 
of the Chernobyl tragedy, are a reflection of serious 
problems with the democracy, the human rights, 
the freedom of the mass media, the restrictions on 
the activities of the non-state actors.
A comparison of resource allocations to govern-
mental and non-governmental organizations within 
the framework of neighborhood programs in 2004-
2006 shows that their distribution benefits mostly 
Belarusian state structures. During this period 
state and public recipients received the following 
shares of resources from the combined budget of 
three neighborhood programs23:
Government institutions and local (state) ad-•	
ministrative bodies – 71%;
Educational establishments and  research in-•	
stitutes – 11%;
Health care institutions – 11%•	
Public associations – 7%•	
Today we can only speak of a “big leap” into the past 
and the ensuing accelerated “catch-up development”. 
After the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA) between the European Communities, its 
member-states and Belarus was “frozen” by the EU 
in 1997 due to the domestic political situation in 
Belarus, bilateral relations remain without a legal 
basis or, otherwise stated, they are not institutional-
ized. Thus, the priority task is to create a relevant 
normative bilateral framework. 
Belarusian officials are well aware of it. Certainly, 
the text of the 1995 PCA is in many respects lagging 
22  24 November 2008 http://naviny.by.
23  Figures cited in: Belitskii V.; Odinets J.; Orlov L. 
“Opyt uchastija Belarusi v programmakh dobro-
sosedstva Evropeiskogo sojuza” [Belarus’ experi-
ence of participation in the EU’s neighborhood 
programs], in Zhurnal mezhdunarodnogo pra-
va i mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii. 2008, No. 3.
behind today’s practice of advanced cooperation 
of the EU with, say, Ukraine and other post-Soviet 
states. The key provisions of the document, however, 
are still important for Belarus and have commo-
nalities with the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) as well as with new initiatives of the Eastern 
Partnership. Such as, “obligation to consolidate the 
political and economic freedom, which constitutes 
the main pillar of cooperation”, provision of the 
necessary structure for political dialogue, support 
of the attempts of Belarus to strengthen democracy 
and development of market economy, etc. Article 
4 of the PCA pointedly stipulates that in case Be-
larus moves along the road of economic reforms 
and the respective prerequisites arise, both parties 
will commit themselves to engage in negotiations 
on the establishment of a free trade zone (FTZ). 
The same is stated in the EC Communication on 
the Eastern Partnership. Meanwhile, a free trade 
zone has been created between Belarus and Russia 
within the framework of its integration project, 
between the member states of the Euro-Asiatic 
Economic Commonwealth (EurAsEC) (in a bilateral 
format), and similar plans had been announced but 
were never implemented within the framework of 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
Russia, in its turn, has put forward the idea of a 
“European Economic Space”. The format the EU+6 
East European partners is obviously competing with 
its post-Soviet analogues24.
According to some estimates, the speed of the 
EU integration projects designed for post-Soviet 
countries is higher than the rate of integration 
processes in the post-Soviet space itself. The pros-
pects of staying in the CIS are becoming ever less 
attractive for its member states and the sphere of 
Russia’s influence is shrinking25.
A free trade zone among states-participants in the 
Eastern Partnership is an ambitious and complex 
project. Joining it by partner states will be a long 
and individual process (the first obvious candidate 
is Ukraine). Both for ENP and the would-be Eastern 
Partnership participants FTZ is a very advanced 
phase of relations, and particularly for Belarus. Much 
efforts and resources will have to be invested along 
the way in adopting the relevant part of European 
legislation, or acquis communautaire. An agreement 
on the creation of a new economic zone which the 
European Commission is going to propose to Az-
erbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine provides for the formation of a FTZ aimed 
at establishing a single internal market. In turn, 
the six states have to adapt their legislation to the 
European norms and acknowledge the jurisdiction 
of the European Court. Minsk seems to realize that 
it will have to do that at least partially, even without 
the aspirations of the EU membership26.
24  Runner, Philippa. “Brussels to proj-
ect ‘soft power’ in post-Soviet zone.” 03 De-
cember 2008 http://euobserver.com
25  04 February 2008, Nezavisimaja gazeta.
26  03 December 2008  www.svaboda.org.
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The ways of using the EC Technical Assistance and 
Information Exchange Instrument (TAIEX) in Bela-
rus in order to provide it with technical and expert 
assistance, which would approximate Belarusian 
legislation to EU legal system, are already under 
consideration. A workshop with the participation of 
the EC experts, who introduced the opportunities 
offered by this instrument to Belarus government 
officials, was held at the Belarusian MFA in mid-
November of 2008. 
So far Belarus is defined only as a potential par-
ticipant of the “Eastern Partnership” (EP) and 
the level of its participation will depend on the 
general development of bilateral relations27. This 
implies that opportunities offered by the EP are 
so far potential as well. The final decision on the 
European Union’s position with regard to Belarus 
will be taken by EU’s General Affairs and External 
Relations Council (GAERC) in mid-April 2009, 
whereby the main criterion will be the progress 
made by the Belarusian authorities in meeting the 
conditions set by the EU.
Minsk is counting on some benefits for itself in 
case of a successful multilateral regional coopera-
tion which at the same time may be conducive to 
the development of its bilateral relations with 
Brussels.
The MFA of Belarus underlines its interest in a 
broad “pragmatic” cooperation with the EU in 
some “mutually beneficial” directions, including 
trade, energy, transport, combating trans-border 
crime, ecology and agriculture28. At the same time, 
aspects of democratization that are inconvenient 
for the Belarusian authorities are left out.
The option of a “selective engagement” of Belarus 
in the EP, however, is problematic, if feasible at 
all. For example, Switzerland may afford such 
reduced format of relations with the European 
Union, although it has serious drawbacks. Thus, 
27  The Eastern Partnership – an ambitious new chapter in 
the EU’s relations with its Eastern neighbours. IP/08/1858. 
03/12/2008. http://europa.eu.
28  Comments of the press secretary of the MFA An-
drei Popov. 03.12.2008. www.mfa.gov.by.
if Switzerland denounces at least one of its seven 
bilateral agreements with the EU, according to 
the “guillotine clause” all seven will be suspended. 
Besides, Switzerland is in no position to exert influ-
ence on the EU policies.
In an attempt to compensate for the current ab-
sence of a PCA or its equivalent the Belarusian side 
worked out a new framework agreement regulating 
the provision of technical assistance by the EU to 
Belarus under the ENPI that succeeded the TACIS 
Program. On November 20, 2008 President’s De-
cree No. 633 authorized Deputy Prime Minister 
of Belarus Andrei Kobyakov to sign this document 
between the Belarusian Government and the Eu-
ropean Commission29 and on December 18, 2008 
the agreement was signed in Minsk during a visit 
by the new Head of the EC Delegation to Ukraine 
and Belarus José Manuel Pinto Teixeira. 
Meanwhile, the main points and especially details 
of the dialogue between Minsk and Brussels remain 
largely non-transparent for the Belarusian public. 
This has caused concern, criticism and speculations 
as to the nature and outcome of a possible deal.
Belarus authorities’ line of behavior in the coming 
months will be decisive. What the mass media calls 
a “chance” for Belarus, in reality breaks down into 
two alternatives: a further lagging behind the East 
European processes on the one hand, or an active.
29  Edict No. 633 of the President of the Re-
public of Belarus of 20 November 2008.
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e a s T e r n  p a r T n e r s h I p :  w h a T 
c a n  B e l a r u s  e x p e c T ?
Dzianis Melyantsou, European Humanities 
University, BISS
On December 12, 2008, European Council ap-
proved the project “Eastern Partnership” drawn 
up by the European Commission for its eastern 
neighbours – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, Moldova and the Ukraine. What new 
can be expected from the given EU initiative and 
what place is designated for Belarus?
In late November European information agency EU 
Observer reported about the drawing up of the draft 
communiqué introducing the project of “Eastern 
Partnership” of the EU. Official presentation of the 
given project was made on December 3, 2008 by the 
joint address of the President of European Commis-
sion Jose Manuel Barosso and the Commissioner 
for external relations and European neighbourhood 
policy Benita Ferrero Waldner. On December 12 
the EU project “Eastern Partnership” was finally 
approved at the summit of the heads of state and 
governments of the EU member states.
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engagement in the broad regional and Pan-European 
development on the other.
“Eastern Partnership” is an answer to the Polish-
Swedish initiative introduced already back in May 
2008 and directed to the strengthening of EU 
relations with the above mentioned countries. The 
project foresees the signing of agreements on as-
sociation, creation of free trade zone and gradual 
formation of a single market following the example 
of the already existing single market with Norway, 
Iceland and Lichtenstein. 
Besides, the project provides for the establishment 
of special visa centers to accelerate the issuance of 
Schengen visas. European Commission proposes 
to cut down the prices for visas gradually and 
simplify the issue procedures and in the long term 
introduce visa-free regime. “Eastern Partnership” 
also provides a gradual increase of the financial as-
sistance to the countries in the given region. In the 
initial draft of the paper the sums of approximately 
600 million Euro for the period of 2009-2013 and 
1.5 billion Euro for 2014-2020 were mentioned 
although in the final draft the sums were radically 
cut and amounted to 350 million Euro till 2013 and 
the future budget was left unspecified.
By making such attractive proposals to their eastern 
neighbours the EU is looking forward to reciprocal 
steps. East European states have to adapt fully ac-
quis communautaire (all block of the EU legal acts, 
which today amounts to around 100 000 pages) and 
recognise the resolutions of the European Court. 
Besides, “Eastern Partnership” provides for the 
conclusion of Memorandum on the mutual un-
derstanding in the field of energy security, which 
later has to lead to joint management and even 
ownership of pipelines.
Motivation of the “Eastern Partnership” as it was 
presented in the draft communiqué seems to 
be quite transparent. “Conflict in Georgia and 
its consequences demonstrated vulnerability of 
Eastern partners. That is why Member States have 
consensus about the necessity to consolidate the 
relationships with our eastern neighbours to help 
them to become closer to the EU”. Thus the issue 
first and foremost is geopolitical and the main 
goal is to gradually include the given region into 
the sphere of influence of the EU. At the same 
time the project “Eastern Partnership” approved 
on December 12, unlike the initial Polish-Swedish 
initiative, stresses unequivocally that the given 
initiative is not directed to the preparation of East 
European countries for the EU membership and 
in principle is an alternative to the membership. 
In other words, in this way the European Union 
plans to implement one of the tasks of the European 
security strategy, namely, to create a belt of good 
neighbourhood and stability around the EU, or a 
cordon sanitaire around its territory.
Such motivation, however, as well as an attempt to 
liberate East European countries from the sphere 
of influence of Russia, contradicts the plans of the 
EU to develop strategic relations with Russia. Since 
Russia seeks to establish a common market with 
some East European countries, EU initiative runs 
counter to the Russian interests in the given region. 
Thus the issue of the strategic relations with the 
Russian Federation a priori blocks the establishment 
of a single market, including EU and participants 
of “Eastern Partnership”. Moreover, it questions 
the implementability of the very idea of building a 
cordon sanitaire between the EU and Russia.  
It should be stressed that the given point is in-
terpreted differently as compared with the initial 
draft of the communiqué, which was prepared in 
November. Here the relations with Russia are not 
named as priority with respect to the policy of 
“Eastern Partnership”. As a result, due to a clear-cut 
contradiction of the given situation to the very idea 
of the “Eastern Partnership” it was decided that the 
phrase “privileged status of Russian –European 
relations” had to be revoked.
The new initiative of the EU, without attaching 
it to the Belarusian issue, is a considerable step 
forwards compared to the European neighbour-
hood policy, which failed to take into account the 
specific character of separate countries and was the 
same to all states bordering with the EU. Failing 
to be the instrument of the EU enlargement, this 
policy proposes to the East European countries an 
institutional basis for the consolidation of contacts 
with the EU in all spheres.  This initiative also 
has a quite expressive symbolic meaning since it 
demonstrates openness of the EU and its interest 
in the East European region. Besides, EU makes 
an attempt to implement an integration project in 
the region, which is a direct alternative to Russia’s 
attempts to reintegrate the post-soviet space.
As for Belarus, the format of its participation in 
the programme “Eastern Partnership” remains 
vague. Nominally, our country is a participant of 
the given initiative but the level of its participation 
will be defined only in spring 2009 after the half-
year period of the suspense of sanctions is over 
and after Belarus demonstrates certain progress 
in liberalization and democratisation.
“Eastern Partnership” contains in itself a certain 
challenge for Belarusian authorities since it proposes 
a real test of conformity of internal-political rheto-
ric (actively using the idea of European Belarus). 
Nevertheless, participation of official Minsk in the 
“Eastern Partnership” today is problematic due to 
the following reasons:
first, EU proposes to the partners an unilateral 
adaptation of European legislation in practically 
all spheres of life which is completely unaccept-
able to the Belarusian party, which declares its 
striving for equal relations;
second, adoption of the EU legislation and 
recognition of the resolutions of the European 
Court means the loss of a considerable part of 
sovereignty, for which Belarus is not prepared 
even in its relations with Russia under the pow-
erful pressure of Kremlin and in exchange for 
enormous subsidies; it would be naïve to expect 
“Eastern 
Partnership” is an 
answer to the Polish-
Swedish initiative 
introduced already 
back in May 2008 
and directed to the 
strengthening of EU 
relations with its 
eastern neighbours.
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that this may happen in the case of the EU when 
the economic  profit is far from apparent;
third, setting up of a free trade zone with the EU 
could be not a welcome achievement but a threat 
to the un-reformed Belarusian economy;
fourth, Belarusian authorities will be quite 
cautious about the point of the project, where 
joint management of pipeline systems is men-
tioned.
It should also be remembered that signing of the 
association agreement that is promised within the 
structure of the “Eastern Partnership” is impossible 
without the prior de-frosting of political relations 
between Minsk and Brussels. In other words, first 
of all the Agreement on the Partnership and Co-
operation (frozen after the constitutional crisis of 
1996) has to be revised and ratified and only then 
an attempt to create more profound relations with 
the EU can be made.
Nevertheless, the new initiative of the EU does not 
have to substitute the strategy of normalization 
of the relations between the EU and Belarus and 
should not be perceived as such. These are two 
completely different documents pursuing different 
goals and tasks. “Eastern Partnership” may become 
an attractive long-term guideline for Belarus after 
the reconstruction of full-fledged political and 
economic relations with the EU and internal de-
mocratization. Today the initiative of the “Eastern 
Partnership” makes the drawing of a consistent and 
efficient “road map” for the normalization of the 
Belarusian-European relations more important and 
more urgent in short-term perspective.
An attempt to 
liberate East 
European countries 
from the sphere of 
influence of Russia, 
contradicts the plans 
of the EU to develop 
strategic relations 
with Russia. 
10
p r o j e c T  p a r T n e r s :
bymedia.net
BELARUSIAN INSTITUTE FOR 
STRATEGIC STUDIES (BISS) 
Sphere of expertise: a platform 
for a dialogue inside the Belarusian 
analytical community and between 
the expert community, the society, 
and the international community.
Website: www.belinstitute.eu 
Contacts: info@belinstitute.eu
Contact person: 
Vitali Silitski, Director
STEFAN BATORY FOUNDATION 
Sphere of expertise: civic 
institutions, development of civil 
society in Poland and Eastern Europe
Address: Sapiezynska 10a, 
00-215 Warszawa
Website: www.batory.org 
Contacts: 
ggromadzki@batory.org.pl, 
+48225360269
Contact person: 
Grzegorz Gromadski, 
Director of International 
Cooperation Department
SWEDISH INTERNATIONAL 
LIBERAL CENTRE  
Sphere of expertise: civil 
society and democracy 
development, human rights 
Address: BOX 2299 – SE 103 
17 Stockholm Sweden
Website: www.silc.se.en   
Contacts: 
Paula.andreska@hotmail.com, 
+37063998638
Contact person: 
Paula Andreska, Representative 
in Lithuania 
TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE NEXT ISSUE OF “BELL”, PLEASE CONTACT:
Julija Narkeviciute
Phone: +37067805634 
Fax: +37052736953
E-mail: julija.narkeviciute@eesc.lt
EASTERN EUROPE STUDIES CENTRE 
